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To demonstrate the usefulness of physical approaches for the study of realistic economic systems, we
investigate the inequality of players’ wealth in one of the most extensively studied econophysical models,
namely, the minority game (MG). We gauge the wealth inequality of players in the MG by a well-known
measure in economics known as the modified Gini index. From our numerical results, we conclude that the
wealth inequality in the MG is very severe near the point of maximum cooperation among players, where the
diversity of the strategy space is approximately equal to the number of strategies at play. In other words, the
optimal cooperation between players comes hand in hand with severe wealth inequality. We also show that our
numerical results in the asymmetric phase of the MG can be reproduced semianalytically using a replica
method.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.70.066110 PACS number(s): 89.65.Gh, 02.50.Le, 05.45.2a, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Econophysics is the study of economic systems by em-
ploying methods and tools developed in physics. Up to now,
many economists have been worrying that econophysicists
are just reinventing the wheel, while many physicists are
studying properties of toy economic models that are not di-
rectly relevant to economics [1]. In this paper, we investigate
the inequality of wealth in a simple-minded econophysical
model known as the minority game (MG) using the so-called
replica trick [2–4]. By doing so, we hope to make a small
step forward in the application of physical methods when
studying real economic systems.
The MG is a simple-minded model of a complex adaptive
system which captures the cooperative behavior of selfish
players in a real market. In this game, N players have to
choose one of the two possible alternatives in each turn
based only on the minority sides in the previous M turns. The
wealth of those who end up in the minority side will be
increased by one while the wealth of the others will be re-
duced by one. To aid the players in making their choice, each
of them is randomly and independently assigned S determin-
istic strategies once and for all when the game begins. Each
deterministic strategy is nothing but a map from the set of all
possible histories (a string of the minority side of the previ-
ous M turns) to the set of the two possible alternatives. All
players make their choices according to their current best
strategies [5,6]. In the MG, the complexity of the system is
usually indicated by the control parameter a;2M+1 /NS
which is the ratio of the size of the strategy space to the size
of strategies at play [6–8].
Clearly, the mean attendance of either choice is N /2 as
the game is symmetrical for both choices. In contrast, the
variance of this probability, which is conventionally denoted
by s2sAd, is highly nontrivial. It attains a very small value
when a<1, indicating that the players are cooperating [7].
That is why previous studies of the MG and its variants
[9–11] focus mainly on the study of s2sAd.
Since the strategies are assigned once and for all to each
player, it is possible that some poorly-performing players are
somehow forced to cooperate with some well-performing
peers. Therefore, it makes sense to study the inequality of
wealth in MG in detail.
In Sec. II, we introduce a common method that measures
wealth inequality in economics known as the modified Gini
index. We then study the Gini index in the MG numerically
in Sec. III. Our numerical simulation shows that both the
maximal cooperation point and the point of maximum wealth
inequality occur around 2M+1<NS. This confirms our suspi-
cion that the apparent cooperation of players shown in the
s2sAd does not tell us the complete story. In fact, we are able
to explain the trend of a modified Gini index qualitatively
using the crowd-anticrowd theory [12–14]. In particular, we
find that the cooperation comes along with wealth inequality
partially because poorly-performing players cannot change
their strategies in the MG. In this way, we show that the
crowd-anticrowd theory is not only able to explain s2sAd,
but also explains other features of other quantities in the MG.
In Sec. IV, we try to reproduce our numerically simulated
Gini index in the so-called asymmetric phase using the rep-
lica method. we recall that one has to average over the dis-
order variables in the conventional replica method; the direct
application of the replica trick cannot provide the wealth
distribution of players and thus the Gini index of the MG.
Fortunately, a careful semianalytic application of the replica
method can be used to reproduce the Gini index qualitatively
as a function of a. Finally, we wrap up by giving a brief
summary of our work in Sec. V.
II. GINI INDEX WITH NEGATIVE WEALTH
In order to measure the inequality of wealth among play-
ers in the MG qualitatively, we follow our economics col-
leagues employing the so-called Gini index. In the original
definition, the Gini index G0 in a population is the mean of
the absolute differences between the wealth all possible pairs
of players [15]. That is to say,
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G0 = 1 −
1
Noj=1
N
f1 + 2sN − jdggj . s1d
In the above equation, N is the number of players in the
population, gj is the wealth earned by a player divided by the
total wealth in the population. and the gj’s are ranked in
ascending order, i.e., g1łg2ł fl łgN. Clearly, G0 ranges
from 0 to 1. The larger G0, the more serious the wealth
inequality. If G0=0, the players’ wealth is uniformly distrib-
uted. If G0.1, one of the players possesses the total wealth
of the population and the wealth inequality is served. How-
ever, Eq. (1) is only applicable in two cases: (1) all players
have positive wealth; or (2) all players have negative wealth.
Since players in the MG may have positive or negative
wealth, we cannot use G0, in general, to measure wealth
inequality. We employ an extension of G0, introduced by
Chen et al., known as the modified Gini index G [16–18], is
given by
G =
2
N
o
j=1
N
jgj −
N + 1
N
1 +
2
N
o
j=1
k
jgj +
1
N
o
j=1
k
gj3o j=1
k gj
gk+1
− s1 + 2kd4
, s2d
where k is defined in such a way that o j=1
k gj ,0 and
o j=1
k+1gj .0. For simplicity, we refer to the modified Gini in-
dex G as the Gini index from now on. Just like the original
Gini index G0, the modified Gini index G measures the nor-
malized wealth inequality of players. Again, G ranges from 0
to 1. The larger the value of G, the more serious the wealth
inequality. When all players are equally wealthy, i.e., k=0,
the term o j=1
k jgj vanishes and G becomes zero. In contrast, if
the total wealth of the system is owned by a single player,
i.e., gN=1 and the term o j=1
N−1jgj =0, then G attains a value of
one as N→‘. Also, G is reduced to the original Gini index
G0 when all players have positive wealth or all players have
negative wealth. Moreover, G is unchanged if the wealth of
each player is multiplied by a nonzero constant.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND QUALITATIVE
EXPLANATIONS
In this section, we investigate the wealth inequality of the
players in the MG. Since we are only interested in studying
the generic properties of the Gini index, we average the Gini
index over Nr=500 independent runs. Because G measures
the normalized wealth distribution of players rather than sim-
ply the first and second moments of this distribution, the time
of convergence of Gini index G is much longer than that of
the variance of attendance and it differs for different initial
configurations of the system. So we employ an adaptive
scheme to check for system equilibration before taking any
measurement. Specifically, in each run, we record the time
series of G until the absolute difference of G between 10000
successive steps is less than 10−6. Then, we obtain the equili-
brated value of G by using finite size scaling. Finally, we
take G to be the average over 50 measurements each sepa-
rated by 1000 steps. G is a measure of the normalized wealth
distribution. From our numerical simulation, G equilibrates
logarithmically and slowly although the wealth of players is
decreasing in each turn. We will explain the reason for con-
vergence of G in detail at the end of this section. We have
performed numerical simulations for the cases where players
draw their strategies from full strategy space and reduced
strategy space [5,8] respectively. The Gini indices obtained
in these two cases are very similar. Since the analytical in-
vestigation performed in Sec. IV is simpler if we focus on
reduced strategy space, we present the numerical results
based on reduced strategy space here for consistency.
Let us study the Gini index averaged over the initial con-
ditions kGlJ versus the control parameter a as shown in Fig.
1. (Note that we use k·lJ to denote the average over the
initial configuration of the system.) Our numerical results
show that the curves of kGlJ for different M coincide. which
means that the Gini index kGlJ, just like the variance of
attendance, depends only on the control parameter a in the
MG.
We now move on to discuss the properties of the Gini
index kGlJ as a function of a in detail. Figure 1 shows that
the Gini index kGlJ is small when a→0. In other words, the
wealth of all players is roughly the same in such a case. In
fact, the small value of kGlJ can be explained by the crowd-
anticrowd theory [12–14] as follows. In the small a regime,
players are likely to have at least one high ranking strategy at
FIG. 1. The Gini index kGlJ and the variance of attendance per
player s2 /N averaged over the initial configuration versus a in the
MG with S=2 for different values of M. The error bar of kGlJ is of
order of at most 10−3. The small bump around a=10 for M =7 is
due to finite size effect.
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each instance, as each player possesses a relatively large por-
tion of strategies of the reduced strategy space. Thus, most of
the players are using the crowd of high ranking strategies,
i.e., those high ranking strategies are overcrowded. Due to
the overcrowding of strategies, each strategy alternatively
wins and loses one virtual score repeatedly when the same
history appears, under the period-two dynamics [7,19]. That
is to say, each strategy has approximately the same probabil-
ity to win for any history. Therefore, all players have roughly
the same amount of wealth and this leads to a small Gini
index kGlJ.
As the control parameter a increases, the Gini index kGlJ
rises rapidly and subsequently attains its maximum value
when the number of strategies at play is approximately equal
to the reduced strategy space size. To explain this, we recall
that the aim of each player in the MG is to maximize one’s
own wealth, which is achieved under the maximization of
the global profit [8]. Subsequently, the attendance of each
choice always tends to bN /2c upon equilibration for all values
of a since the two alternatives are symmetric in the MG.
That is to say, the system always “distributes” approximately
the same amount of wealth to the population in each turn
regardless of the value of a. Moreover, whenever a<ac,
unlike in the cases of symmetric and asymmetric phases of
the MG, it is not uncommon for a player to hold only low
ranking strategies since the number of strategies at play and
the reduced strategy space size are of the same order. Con-
sequently, a significant number of players are forced to use
the crowd of low ranking strategies and keep on losing. On
the other hand, those players picking the crowd of high rank-
ing strategies have a higher winning probability and keep on
using those strategies. Note that the ranking of the strategies
is almost unchanged when a<ac [12–14]. As a result, the
wealth distribution of players would become relatively di-
verse and the Gini index kGlJ of the population attains its
maximum value when a→ac.
Actually, the increase in the Gini index when a→ac+ can
be justified by the frozen probability of the MG. We recall
that in the MG a player employs the virtual score system to
determine which strategy to use in the next time step. In the
asymmetric phase, the probability that a strategy assigned to
a player has a virtual score asymptotically higher than all the
other strategies assigned to the same player increases as a
decreases. Some players end up using only one strategy after
the system equilibrates, they are regard as frozen players.
The frozen probability indicates the number of frozen play-
ers. A small frozen probability, i.e., most players in the game
keep changing their best strategies, implies that only a few
player will keep on winning or keep on losing all the time
and the Gini index should be low. On the other hand, a high
frozen probability may indicate that while some frozen play-
ers are using strategies that win most of time, the best per-
forming strategies for the other frozen players are losing
badly. Thus, there is a wide spread in wealth distribution of
players. The Gini index should be high in this case. The
frozen probability follows the same trend of Gini index as
a→ac+, which further supports the validity of the result of
the Gini index. Moreover, when a<ac, it is likely that those
frozen players which form the majority of crowds and anti-
crowds in the game use anticorrelated strategy pairs, result-
ing in effective crowd-anticrowd cancellation between frozen
players. Also, those frozen players who picked the anticorre-
lated strategy pairs keep winning or keep losing throughout
the game.
After attaining the maximum value, the Gini index kGlJ
decreases and gradually tends to zero when the control pa-
rameter a further increases. According to crowd-anticrowd
theory [12–14], it is because most of the strategies at play are
uncorrelated to each other when the strategy space size be-
comes much larger than the number of strategies at play.
Therefore, it is as if each player is making random choices in
the game when a is large. Hence, the winning probability of
all strategies is roughly the same. As a result, the Gini index
kGlJ of the population is small in this regime.
As we have reasoned above, the winning probability of
each individual player is steady after equilibration of the sys-
tem. Since the wealth distribution depends solely on the win-
ning probabilities of individual players, the gj’s, and hence
the Gini index G, converge over a sufficiently long time.
Moreover, it is easy to check that the gj’s converge logarith-
mically. Therefore, the equilibration time for G is much
longer than that of s2sAd.
IV. SEMIANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE GINI INDEX IN
MG USING THE REPLICA TRICK
A. Methodology
In the previous section, we have explained the wealth
inequality of the players in the MG qualitatively. In fact, the
system of the MG can be described as a disorder spin system
[2,3] since the dynamics of the MG indeed minimizes a glo-
bal function related to market predictability. In this section,
we calculate the Gini index G of the population in MG semi-
analytically by mapping the MG to a spin glass. As we shall
see, this approach works well whenever a.ac.
Let us start to link the MG, a repeated game with N play-
ers, to the spin glass. In this formalism, every player has to
choose one out of two actions ±1 corresponding to the two
alternatives at each time step. We denote the action of the ith
player at time t by cistd. After all players have chosen their
actions, those players choosing the minority action win and
gain one unit of wealth while all the others lose one. In the
MG, the only public information available to the players is
the so-called history, which is the string of the minority ac-
tion of the last M time steps. Namely, the history is a string
fPst−Md , . . . ,Pst−1dg, where Pstd denotes the minority ac-
tion at time t. For convenience, we label the history by an
index m as follows:
mstd = Pst − Md 3 2M−1 + Pst − M − 1d 3 2M−2
+ fl + Pst − 1d . s3d
At the beginning of the game, each player picks once and for
all S strategies randomly from the strategy space. In fact, a
strategy specifies an action as,i
m taken by the ith player for all
possible histories m=1, . . . ,2M. In the MG, agents make use
of the virtual score, i.e., the hypothetical profit for using a
strategy throughout the game, to evaluate the performance of
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a strategy. To guess the next global minority action, each
player uses their own current best strategy which is the strat-
egy with the highest virtual score at that moment. Assuming
each player has S=2 strategies which are labeled by “1” and
“2,” we define the disorder variables hvi
m
,ji
mj as
wi
m
=
a+,i
m + a
−,i
m
2
, ji
m
=
a+,i
m
− a
−,i
m
2
. s4d
Here we use the spin variable sistd= ±1 to denote the strategy
used by the ith player at time t. Thus the action of this player
is given by
cistd = vi
mstd + sistdji
mstd
. s5d
With the above formalism, we can employ a statistical tool
called the replica trick [3,4] to study the stationary state
properties of the MG by solving the ground state of the
Hamiltonian H:
HhmW j = V2 + 2o
i=1
N
Vjimi + o
i,j
N
jij jmimj , s6d
where mi;ksistdl and Vm=oi=1
N vi
m
. Note that O¯ denotes the
average over history m and k·l denotes the average over time
t. In other words, our aim is to find the minimum of HhmW j
defined by
min
mW Pf− 1,1gN
HhmW j = − lim
b→‘
1
b
kln ZsbdlJ, s7d
where the partition function
Zsbd = TrmW e−bHhmW j. s8d
Here, TrmW denotes the integral of mW on f−1,1gN, k·lJ denotes
the average over the disorder variables as,i
m (i.e., the quenched
disorder J of the system) and b stands for the inverse tem-
perature. In fact, the ground state solution of H depends on
the disorder variables. However, in the thermodynamic limit,
the ground state of H has a unique solution for all quenched
disorder. Thus, in the replica calculation, we seek for ground
state solution of the Hamiltonian H on average of the
quenched disorder. In order to evaluate kln ZlJ, we construct
the partition function Zn by studying n (a non-negative inte-
ger) replicas of the system with identical disorder variables
has,i
m j. Then, we perform a semianalytical continuation to ex-
tend this function for non-integer n. In this way, the average
of ln Z over has,i
m j is reduced to
kln ZlJ = lim
n→0
1
n
lnkZnlJ. s9d
We also define the free energy density FbsQˆ , rˆd by
kZnlJ =E drˆE dQˆ expf− bnNFbsQˆ , rˆdg , s10d
where Qa,b= s1/NdoiNmiamib is the overlap matrix and ra,b are
the associated Lagrange multipliers. Hence, we can find the
stationary state solution of H in the thermodynamic limit N
→‘ by finding the minima of FbsQˆ , rˆd as
lim
N→‘
min
mW Pf1,− 1gN
Hhmj
N
< lim
b→‘
lim
n→0
min FbsQˆ , rˆd . s11d
In fact, we can find the minima in the replica symmetric
(RS) ansatz by solving the saddle point equations [4,10]:
]Fb
]ra,b
= 0 and
]Fb
]Qa,b
= 0 " a,b . s12d
In this ansatz, the matrices rˆ, Qˆ corresponding to min Fb, are
assumed to be in the following form:
Qa,b =
1
Noi
N
mi
ami
b
= H q for a Þ b ,Q for a = b , J s13d
and
ra,b = H2r for a Þ b ,R for a = b , J s14d
for all a ,b=1,2 , . . . ,n. Therefore, using the RS ansatz, the
minimum value of Fb in the n→0 limit is given by
FsRSd = lim
n→0
min FbsQˆ , rˆd =
a
2b
lnF1 + b
a
sQ − qdG
+
as1 + qd
2fa + bsQ − qdg −
1
b
E dFsldlnFE
−1
1
dm
3exp− bVsmuldG + ab2 sRQ − rqd , s15d
where Fsld is the normal distribution and the potential
Vsm uld=−˛arlm+ sab /2dsr−Rdm2.
Using the saddle point equations, we arrive at [4,10]
a
r2
= 2 −˛ 2
p
1
r
e−r
2/2
− S1 − 1
r2
DerfS r˛2D , s16d
where r is a disorder variable and depends on the control
parameter a. The probability distribution of the “average ac-
tion” of a player, m, is then given by [3]
Psmd =
fsrd
2
fdsm − 1d + dsm + 1dg +
r
˛2p
e−srmd
2/2
,
s17d
where fsrd=1−erfsr /˛2d, ds0d=1 and dsxd=0 whenever x
Þ0. Note that Eqs. (16) and (17) are only valid for a.ac.
For a,ac, the replica calculation cannot give correct pre-
dictions for the probability distribution of spin variable m
because it is unable to reproduce the period-two dynamics of
the system [4].
Our aim is to calculate the Gini index of the players in the
MG using the replica trick. At first glance, one might argue
that the distribution of gi can be reproduced analytically us-
ing the replica trick. However, the replica trick can only
generate the average gain of a group of players rather than
the wealth of an individual player. This is why Challet did
not compute the theoretical gain of individual players ana-
lytically by using the replica trick for the MG. In fact, he
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computes the gain semianalytically using the disorder spin
variable mi measured in the simulations instead [10,20]. To
reproduce the wealth distribution of players, we need to
know the actions of each individual player sistd at time t for
each individual particular quenched disorder. However, sistd
cannot be found by the replica trick. So we approximate sistd
by the disorder spin variable mi generated stochastically
from the distribution Psmd which is found by the replica
trick. Then, the Gini index GsJd can be calculated from the
wealth distribution of the players for that quenched disorder.
As we are only interested in the generic properties of the
Gini index, we calculate the Gini index averaged over
quenched disorder kGlJ. This should be done by calculating
the Gini index of each individual quenched disorder GsJd
first and then taking average over all quenched disorders.
In practice, we perform the stochastic simulation to gen-
erate the wealth distribution of population in the MG for an
individual quenched disorder in the following way. Before
starting the simulation, the quenched disorder J is formed
by allowing each player to pick two strategies randomly
from the reduced strategy space. Next, each player draws the
spin variable m from the distribution Psmd as shown in Eq.
(17). Those players with m= ±1 are called frozen players
because they keep on using a strategy throughout the game.
Then, in each step of the game, players choose one of their
own strategies according to their own spin variable m to
guess the next global minority side. In practice, the strategy
used by the ith player at time t, sistd, is chosen by calling a
uniform random variate z on f−1,1g. Then we set sistd=1 if
miøz and sistd=−1 otherwise. Therefore, for the history
nstd, the action of the ith player at time t can be written as
xistd = vi
nstd + sistdji
nstd
. s18d
Note that the history nstd is generated randomly at each time
step t in our simulation. In addition, the difference in the
numbers of players choosing the two alternatives at time t is
given by
Xstd = o
i=1
N
xistd . s19d
So we obtain the minority side at time t
Qstd = − sgnXstd . s20d
After determining the minority side, the wealth of the ith
players, wistd, is updated by
wist + 1d = wistd + 2dxistd − Qstd − 1. s21d
We repeat the above algorithm Ns times for the system to
equilibrate. After the equilibration, we measure on the Gini
index of the population for the quenched disorder J using
Eq. (2). Then we calculate the average Gini index for 500
independent runs. We denote the Gini index calculated by
this algorithm with averaging over the quenched disorder by
kGlJ
R
. In fact, we find that the average Gini index kGlJ con-
verges after Ns=500P iterations, where P=2M is the number
of possible histories.
B. Semianalytical results using stochastic simulation
Figure 2 gives the Gini index obtained from semianalyti-
cal calculation of kGlJ
R versus the control parameter a for
MG with a.ac. We find that the trend of the curves of kGlJ
R
agrees with the numerical findings. This implies that we have
successfully reproduced the numerical results of the Gini in-
dex in the asymmetric phase of the MG by using the replica
method. However, the curves of kGlJ
R are systematically
lower than those from numerical simulation. This is because
the coupling between the actions of players and the dynamics
of the system is completely ignored in our stochastic simu-
lation as the actions of the players depend only on the spin
variable m. Consequently, the global cooperation among the
players is suppressed in our semianalytical calculation.
Hence, the wealth distribution of players is less diverse
which results in underestimation of the Gini index in the
MG.
To make our semianalytical calculation more “realistic,”
we allow the history nstd to be updated sequentially by
nstd = f2nst − 1d + Qstdg mod P , s22d
and we denote the Gini index averaged over the quenched
disorder calculated in this approach by kGlJ
S
. Note that kGlJ
R
and kGlJ
S are calculated using the same algorithm except that
the history is updated in a different way. Figure 3 shows the
Gini index kGlJ
S versus the control parameter a in the MG.
We observe that the values of kGlJ
S agree well with the nu-
merical results when a is large. According to crowd-
anticrowd theory, if a is large, most strategies of the players
are uncorrelated to each other due to the undersampling of
FIG. 2. The average Gini index found in stochastic simulation
using random history kGlJ
R versus the control parameter a in the
asymmetric phase of the MG with Ns=500P and S=2 for different
M. For comparison purpose, the solid line indicates the correspond-
ing numerical results in the MG with M =9.
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the strategy space. Moreover, most of the strategies are used
by either one or none of the players in the MG whenever
a→‘. Therefore, the cooperation between the players can
be neglected for a→‘. In addition, the probability of the
occurrence of different histories is not the same in the MG
when a→‘ [21]. Indeed, these two conditions are satisfied
in our stochastic simulation using the sequential history. So,
the values of kGlJ
S match the numerical estimates when a is
large.
On the other hand, when a approaches ac
+
, the values of
kGlJ
S become larger than the numerical results. This discrep-
ancy can be explained as follows. As mentioned in Sec. III,
since there is effective crowd-anticrowd cancellation, the his-
tory in the MG becomes more uniform as a approaches ac
+
[21]. In contrast, although players still have the same chance
to pick anticorrelated pairs separately at the beginning of the
game in our sequential simulation, the strategy actually used
by each player at each turn is not determined by its virtual
score, but a randomly assigned disorder spin variable mi in-
stead. Consequently, two players are less likely to be frozen
on an anticorrelated strategy pair. This makes the crowd-
anticrowd cancellation less effective among frozen players in
our sequential simulation. So, the actions among these frozen
players may give a strong bias in the output, especially for
a<ac, where frozen probability is highest. In turn, the his-
tory becomes much more nonuniform. This greatly increases
the Gini index as some players have more chance to stay at
the winning (or losing) side.
Finally, we remark that both kGlJ
R and kGlJ
S calculated by
the stochastic simulation are independent of M. This is ex-
pected, since the results of the replica calculation do not
depend explicitly on M.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have investigated the inequality of wealth
among players in the MG using the well-known measure in
economics called the Gini index. In particular, our numerical
findings show that the wealth inequality of players is very
severe near the point of maximum global cooperation ac.
That is to say, in the minority game, global cooperation
comes hand in hand with uneven distribution of players’
wealth. Specifically, a significant number of players are
forced to use the low ranking strategies and cooperate with
those players using the high ranking strategies since the
number of strategies at play and the reduced strategy space
size are of the same order whenever a→ac. In this respect,
we have showed that the crowd-anticrowd theory offers a
simple and effective platform to study the wealth inequality
in the MG.
In addition, we have studied the Gini index semianalyti-
cally by mapping the system of the MG to a spin glass. With
this formalism, we semianalytically reproduce our numeri-
cally simulated Gini index in the asymmetric phase of MG
by investigating the stationary state properties of MG using
the replica trick.
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